RED TEAM

A pentest finds the holes. A red team finds out if anyone is watching.

A penetration test lists your vulnerabilities. A red team answers the harder question: if a real, determined attacker came for you tomorrow, would your people, process and technology notice, and could you stop them before they reached what matters?

We emulate a genuine adversary against a real objective, quietly, end to end, and show you exactly how far they get and who sees them.

INTRODUCTORY MEETING

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RED TEAM VS PENETRATION TEST

Red team or penetration test,which one you need.

A penetration test asks 'what is exploitable here?' A red team asks 'would we detect and stop a real attacker going for something specific?'

YOU ARE HERE

Red team

Penetration test

Question it answers
Would we detect and stop a real attacker?
What is exploitable in this scope?
Goal
Reach a defined objective (data, domain, funds).
Find and validate as many vulnerabilities as possible.
Visibility
Covert. Your blue team is not told.
Announced and cooperative.
What it tests
People, process, technology, detection and response.
Technical vulnerabilities in the target.
Key metrics
MTTD, MTTC, objectives reached, ATT&CK coverage.
Number and severity of findings.
Fits when
You have a security team and want to test it. DORA / TIBER-EU.
You want to find and fix weaknesses, or meet a compliance baseline.

Would we detect and stop a real attacker?

Two ways to run it, and why teams book one.

Real adversaries don’t always start at zero. The cheapest, most useful model is often the one that starts with the attacker already inside, because it answers the question your incident response team actually has.

MODEL A

Initial Access

We start from the outside with nothing but public information, exactly as a real attacker would. Most of the calendar goes on reconnaissance, which is what makes this the longer engagement, and then on the one attempt that has to work. Phishing or social engineering only if it fits your threat model and you approve it.

Recon
START
Entry
Foothold
Movement
Objective
  • Recon first, then one attempt: phish, exposed service or a valid credential
  • Tests perimeter, awareness and detection on entry
  • Best when the threat model is an external, opportunistic attacker
  • Longer engagement, because reconnaissance is where the weeks go
MODEL B

Assumed Breach

We start where a real intrusion actually starts: a beacon running on a working employee machine, with no privileges. Not a spare laptop and not a gold image, because an operator lives off the situational awareness that daily use leaves behind, and preferably not an IT machine. From there we measure how fast you detect movement, how far it gets and how well containment works. If Initial Access is in scope but cannot be achieved in the agreed window, we transition to the foothold so the measurement still happens. Under TIBER-EU and the DORA TLPT RTS that is a leg-up, and CBEST calls it de-chaining: it is planned in advance, granted by the Control Team and logged in the report.

Foothold
START
Discovery
Movement
Objective
  • Starts at the foothold: the clock runs from day one
  • Tests discovery, privileges, lateral movement, cloud and detection
  • Best when the threat model is "a phish will eventually land"
  • Tighter engagement, higher signal per day

A red team is rarely routine. A board question about ransomware readiness, a DORA or TIBER-EU obligation, a new SOC you want to prove out, an incident in your sector, or a maturity milestone forces it. Pick the one that is true for you today.

See exactly how a real attack would play out.

An illustrative engagement, milestone by milestone: what the red team did at each step, the ATT&CK technique behind every move, and what the defenders saw and did not see. The company, the accounts and the machines are invented. What repeats from one engagement to the next is the sequence, not the names. The milestones mark the order of the story, not how long your exercise takes: that comes out of the scope.

Red Team Engagement · Asperis Security
The first move never touches your network.

Before a single packet reaches you, the operator already knows who signs your invoices, who answers your helpdesk and which security products your job ads name. Then the infrastructure goes up, and the operator waits for a day on which a message like this one raises no eyebrows.

OSINT · certificate transparency Look-alike domain · evilginx
PHISH DELIVERYOAUTH GRANT
SubjectAction required · Verify access by EOD
"Your SSO session expired. Re-authorise in one click…"
[ Authorize ]
Authorize Helpdesk Login
  • Read your mailbox
  • Read contacts
  • Sign in offline
Allow ✓
token=eyJ0eXAiOi… ✓ accepted
Red Team Engagement · Asperis Security
No password stolen. No alarm to raise.

What gets authorised is not a login, it is an application. From that moment the operator reads that mailbox with a consent somebody granted, and the next mail the company receives comes from the inside, from an address everybody trusts.

Mythic / Sliver Signed loader · reflective payload
C2 BEACON · MYTHIC● LIVE
10:26:29[+] task: whoami /priv · queued
10:26:29[~] 612ms · TGT cached · S-1-5-21-… (svc_deploy)
10:26:29[+] beacon 4f2a checking in · sleep 60s · jitter 30%
10:26:29[!] T1134.004 parent spoof · no alert raised
10:26:29[+] task: nltest /domain_trusts · queued
10:26:29[~] 188ms · 6 KB · 200 OK
$
$
Red Team Engagement · Asperis Security
The path is already there. We only have to read it.

Privilege escalation in a mature domain is rarely an exploit. It is a permission granted years ago for a reason that made sense at the time, and a certificate template that trusts whoever asks. Every estate has at least one.

BloodHound / SharpHound Certify / Rubeus
ATTACK PATH · BLOODHOUNDESC1 · 4 hops
GenericWriteAddKeyCredentialLinkEnroll-On-Behalf-OfUSRm.ortegaGRPIT-HelpdeskCMPWS-014.corpCRTUser-AuthDCDOMAIN ADMIN
Red Team Engagement · Asperis Security
Across the estate, using your own doors.

From here on nothing looks like an attack. The operator authenticates the way your administrators authenticate, connects the way your administrators connect, and crosses into the cloud through an identity that on-premises and tenant both trust.

Rubeus · PKINIT Graph · app registrations
LATERAL · WMI · RDP · CLOUD4 hops · 11 min
WS-014on-premFS-CORP-01fileserverJUMP-DC-02tier-1azure.signincloudWMIPSExecSTS abuse
Red Team Engagement · Asperis Security
We prove it. We do not take it.

The objective is agreed with you before day one, and it is the thing that would genuinely hurt if somebody else got there first. We reach it, we prove we reached it, and we spend the rest of the exercise handing the whole route back to your team.

Hashed canary Replay session
CANARY · READ-ONLY PROOFSHA-256 · signed
targetdb-prod-01:/var/lib/postgresql/customers
actionread-only · 1 row · sample hashed
writing canary
proof captured · canary_72f4.pdf · 0.4 KB
DLPno DLP alert · policy should have fired

Loved by security teams.

Names, roles and companies on the record.

We at Etnia highly value our collaboration with Asperis Security. Their professionalism, approachability, quick response and ability to adapt to our needs have been key in every project. The quality of service and continuous support always give us peace of mind. Without a doubt, it is a pleasure to have them as technology partners.
Sergi Leno, Systems Manager
ETNIA Barcelona
At NPAW we have collaborated with Asperis on various security initiatives and the experience has been very positive. We especially value their ability to adapt to our needs and the depth with which they approach each project. Results are clear, structured and useful for decision-making and continuous security improvement. We like working with Asperis for the judgment and value they bring to every collaboration. Their work has helped us strengthen our security level.
Sergi Laencina Verdaguer, CISO
NPAW
ASPERIS has worked alongside us to define and implement our cybersecurity roadmap in Microsoft 365 with a structured approach aligned to business objectives. Thanks to their advice, we took the strategic step of completing our Microsoft ecosystem and reinforcing it with CrowdStrike for advanced mobile device protection, significantly raising our security level.
Jordi Bondia, IT Director
SALVI
With Asperis you don’t hire a service. You hire a partner. They don’t look to bill a project. They look to establish a relationship of trust, caring about the key points that affect your organisation’s security. Professionalism, know-how and diligence.
Juan Valer Tecedor, Software Engineer
GNOSS
READY WHEN YOU ARE

Ready to find out what your defences really do?

Thirty minutes with the specialist who would lead your engagement, to agree the objective and the model.

Every move, every artefact: in one operating layer.

The whole engagement lives here, alongside the timeline, the metrics, the evidence and the specialist who ran it.

  • Live storyline of every operator action
  • MITRE ATT&CK mapping per move
  • MTTD / MTTC per technique, computed automatically
  • Full artefact pack: PCAPs, IOCs, logs, screenshots

What you actually get, and why it is different.

Most red teams hand back a story of how they won. Here is where we go further.

Threat-led, not generic

We emulate the adversary that actually targets your sector, built from real intelligence, not a one-size playbook. The exercise reflects who would really come for you.

We test the defenders, not just the doors

Detection and response are measured, not assumed. You get MTTD and MTTC, the objectives reached, and your coverage against MITRE ATT&CK, numbers a board and a SOC can both act on.

Safe by design

A Control Team, clear Rules of Engagement, a Pre-Out checkpoint before any crown jewel and a Hot-Wash debrief within 24 to 48 hours of a key detection. A covert exercise that never becomes a real incident.

Detections you keep

An Attack Replay walks your defenders through exactly what we did, with the artefacts and indicators to build lasting detections. The engagement makes your blue team permanently better, and a free retest confirms the fixes held.

Applicability test

Does DORA TLPT apply to you?

Four questions, and it all resolves on this page.

Nothing is sent. Your answers never leave your browser and we do not ask for your email.

What kind of entity are you?

This is the list in Article 2(1) of DORA. If your category is not there, the regulation most likely does not apply to you.

Banking and payments

Markets and investment

Insurance and pensions

Other

Where is the entity authorised or registered?
How big is the entity?

DORA defines microenterprise in Article 3, point 60. Literal: "a financial entity, other than a trading venue, a central counterparty, a trade repository or a central securities depository, which employs fewer than 10 persons and has an annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total that does not exceed EUR 2 million".

Has your competent authority already notified you that you must carry out a TLPT?

The notification is what opens the preparation phase. Article 9(1) of the TLPT RTS says that a financial entity identified under Article 26(8), third subparagraph, of DORA shall start a threat-led penetration test following the notification from the TLPT authority that such a test is appropriate.

Your result

You are in the group authorities designate from. Today you have no TLPT obligation.

By entity type, by where you are authorised and by size, you fit inside the set from which competent authorities pick which entities have to run a TLPT. Fitting does not mean being picked.

Who has to run one is determined by the competent authority, entity by entity. Article 26(8), third subparagraph, of DORA puts it plainly: competent authorities shall identify the financial entities that are required to perform threat-led penetration tests. Article 2 of the TLPT RTS sets out the criteria they use: impact, systemic character and ICT risk profile. There is no threshold you cross on your own and no public list you sign up to.

The notification arrives in writing from your competent authority and is addressed to the entity, not to a person. If nobody in the entity has received it, you have not been identified. And once it arrives you notice: Article 9(2) of the RTS gives you three months to submit the project charter, the control team lead’s details, the communication channels and the test code name. If it had arrived, the organisation would know.

We did not ask about your size because in your case it changes nothing. Article 3, point 60, of DORA excludes trading venues, central counterparties, trade repositories and central securities depositories from the definition of microenterprise. That exit does not exist for you.

What you can do today, without depending on anyone else:

  • Check the threshold above against your own figures. It is the first criterion your authority looks at.
  • Review the contractual requirements with your ICT providers, which is the part of DORA that already applies to you today.
  • If what you want to know is how long your team would take to detect someone inside, that is measured by a red team, regulation or no regulation.

Your result

You have been notified. From here the calendar is set by the regulation.

From the notification onwards, the test has to meet Article 26 of DORA and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, the TLPT regulatory technical standards. The clocks already running, with the article for each one so you do not have to take our word for it:

  • Three months from the notification to submit the project charter, the control team lead’s details, whether you will use internal or external testers, the communication channels and the test code name (Article 9(2) of the RTS).
  • A control team made up of your own staff, with its lead, formed after the authority validates that initiation information (Article 9(4)).
  • A test manager and at least one substitute, appointed by the authority. Not by the entity and not by the provider (Article 3(2)).
  • An active red team testing phase of at least 12 weeks (Article 11(5)).
  • Replay and purple teaming within ten weeks of the end of the active phase (Article 12(5)).
  • The attestation is issued by the authority, not by the provider, and it does not move the responsibility for the impact of the test away from you (Article 26(7) of DORA).
  • And the test repeats at least every three years (Article 26(1) of DORA).

On who you can hire.

Article 27(1) of DORA does not say who gets tested: it sets the bar the testers have to clear. It asks for the highest suitability and reputation; technical and organisational capabilities with demonstrated specific expertise in threat intelligence, penetration testing and red team testing; certification by an accreditation body in a member state or adherence to formal codes of conduct or ethical frameworks; an independent assurance or audit report; and professional indemnity insurance covering the risks of misconduct and negligence. Article 7 of the RTS adds the specific documentation your control team will have to keep on file for each provider, including CVs, certifications and references from previous engagements. Ask whoever pitches you to set it out in writing. Us first.

Where we stand.

Of that bar, there are two we can evidence today: the independent assurance or audit report of point (d), and the professional indemnity insurance covering misconduct and negligence of point (e). The rest we cannot vouch for today. So we are not going to tell you we can run your regulated TLPT, or that we clear the Article 27 bar.

What we do run is unregulated red team work: measuring how long your team takes to detect and contain someone already inside. It is a different product, bought for a different reason. If that is what you are after, write to [email protected].

Your result

A TIBER exercise can be exactly how your TLPT gets carried out. Your competent authority is the one who determines that.

TIBER-EU and DORA TLPT are not two separate worlds. Article 26(11) of DORA instructs the European Supervisory Authorities to develop the TLPT technical standards in accordance with the TIBER-EU framework. And the TIBER-EU framework updated in February 2025 says it from the other side: the TLPT-related requirements under DORA are included in its testing process, so that an entity completing a test under a national or European-level implementation of TIBER-EU will be DORA TLPT-compliant, provided it fulfils the formal requirements set by the competent authorities. That same framework adds that when it is used for TLPT obligations under DORA, the respective TLPT authorities are considered TIBER authorities for that test.

In other words: the same exercise can be voluntary, or it can be your regulated TLPT. What changes is not the method, it is the heading it runs under, and the authority determines that. Not the provider, and not you.

The useful question is this one, and it is yours to ask:

Ask your test manager, or the authority team running the exercise, whether your test is being carried out as your DORA TLPT or outside it. The answer determines the regulation’s deadlines, who signs the attestation, and whether the test counts towards the at-least-every-three-years cycle of Article 26(1).

On TIBER-ES specifically.

Its owning authority is the Banco de España, with the participation of the CNMV and the DGSFP when the entities to be tested fall within their respective areas of competence. The published implementation guide is dated January 2022 and describes participation as voluntary, but it predates DORA, the TLPT technical standards and the February 2025 update of TIBER-EU. Do not read that guide as putting your exercise outside DORA.

Where we stand.

Of the requirements Article 27(1) of DORA places on testers, there are two we can evidence today: the independent assurance or audit report of point (d), and the professional indemnity insurance covering misconduct and negligence of point (e). That is why we are not going to tell you we can run a regulated TLPT for you. Unregulated red team work we do run, and it is a different product.

Your result

DORA applies to you. TLPT does not.

Article 26(1) of DORA leaves microenterprises outside the TLPT obligation, together with the entities in Article 16(1), first subparagraph. DORA defines microenterprise in Article 3, point 60: "a financial entity, other than a trading venue, a central counterparty, a trade repository or a central securities depository, which employs fewer than 10 persons and has an annual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total that does not exceed EUR 2 million". Based on your answers, that is where you are. You are not part of the group authorities designate from.

The rest of DORA does apply to you: ICT risk management, major incident reporting, digital operational resilience testing, and the contractual requirements with your ICT providers.

And the underlying question does not depend on DORA.

The reasons a red team gets bought with no regulation involved are usually these four:

  • A board question about ransomware readiness.
  • A new SOC, in-house or outsourced, that you want to prove works.
  • A large client asking for it in their supplier due diligence.
  • An incident in your sector that has changed the conversation internally.

If you want to measure detection and response, a red team does that. If what you need is coverage over a specific surface, the answer is a pentest. Tell us which fits at [email protected].

Your result

You are in the simplified framework. TLPT does not concern you.

Article 26(1) of DORA excludes from the TLPT obligation the entities referred to in Article 16(1), first subparagraph. That subparagraph names small and non-interconnected investment firms, payment institutions exempted under Directive (EU) 2015/2366, institutions exempted under Directive 2013/36/EU for which the member state has decided not to apply the option in Article 2(4), electronic money institutions exempted under Directive 2009/110/EC, and small institutions for occupational retirement provision. Based on your answers, you are in that group.

What does apply to you is the simplified ICT risk management framework of Article 16 and the contractual requirements with your ICT providers.

And the underlying question does not depend on DORA.

The reasons a red team gets bought with no regulation involved are usually these four:

  • A board question about ransomware readiness.
  • A new SOC, in-house or outsourced, that you want to prove works.
  • A large client asking for it in their supplier due diligence.
  • An incident in your sector that has changed the conversation internally.

If you want to measure detection and response, a red team does that. If what you need is coverage over a specific surface, the answer is a pentest. Tell us which fits at [email protected].

Your result

DORA does not apply to you.

Article 2(3)(e) of DORA leaves outside the regulation "insurance intermediaries, reinsurance intermediaries and ancillary insurance intermediaries that are microenterprises or small or medium-sized enterprises". DORA defines those three sizes in Article 3, points 60, 63 and 64: a medium-sized enterprise is one that employs fewer than 250 persons and has an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million and/or an annual balance sheet not exceeding EUR 43 million. Based on your answers you are inside that group, so neither the regulation nor TLPT binds you.

Two things worth keeping in mind:

  • If you work for entities that are subject to DORA, their contractual requirements for ICT providers can reach you through the contract even though the regulation does not bind you directly.
  • Other security regulation may apply to you by another route. This test only looks at DORA.

And the underlying question still stands: if someone got into your network today, how long would it take you to see it? That is measured the same way, regulation or no regulation. Write to [email protected].

Your result

DORA does not apply to you.

Article 2(3)(c) of DORA leaves outside the regulation "institutions for occupational retirement provision which operate pension schemes which together do not have more than 15 members in total". Based on your answers that is your case, so neither the regulation nor TLPT binds you.

Two things worth keeping in mind:

  • If you work for entities that are subject to DORA, their contractual requirements for ICT providers can reach you through the contract even though the regulation does not bind you directly.
  • Other security regulation may apply to you by another route. This test only looks at DORA.

And the underlying question still stands: if someone got into your network today, how long would it take you to see it? That is measured the same way, regulation or no regulation. Write to [email protected].

Your result

You are inside DORA, but on the other side of the contract.

ICT third-party service providers are point (u) of Article 2(1). And there is a detail in the text worth knowing: paragraph 2 of that same article reserves the name "financial entities" for points (a) to (t). You are not one, and TLPT is an obligation of the financial entity, not of the provider. What reaches you is something else:

  • The contractual requirements your financial clients have to carry into the contracts they sign with you.
  • If the European Supervisory Authorities designate you a critical ICT third-party service provider, you enter the Oversight Framework, with a Lead Overseer assigned.
  • If a client of yours is identified for a TLPT, the scope can reach the services you provide to them. Article 26(3) requires the financial entity to take the necessary measures to secure your participation, and Article 26(4) provides that in certain cases you contract the tester directly yourselves, for a pooled test covering several financial entities. That is negotiated and documented before it starts, not during.

The useful part:

If you sell to the financial sector, what usually unblocks a supplier due diligence is being able to show a recent offensive test against the service you provide, with the report and the fixes verified. Write to [email protected].

Your result

DORA is not about you.

DORA applies to the entity types listed in its Article 2(1), all of them in the financial sector, plus ICT third-party service providers. If you are not on that list, neither the regulation nor TLPT binds you.

It can still reach you through contracts: if you sell to banking, insurance or markets, your clients are subject to it and will pass security requirements on to you. And other regulation may apply to you by another route, because this test only looks at DORA.

The underlying question holds with no regulation involved: how long would your team take to detect someone inside? That is exactly what a red team measures. Write to [email protected].

Your result

With no EU authorisation, DORA does not bind you directly.

DORA is addressed to entities authorised or registered in the European Union. With no EU authorisation or registration, the regulation does not bind you on its own, and the Article 26 TLPT identification does not reach you either.

Two routes by which it can still reach you:

  • Through contracts, if you provide services to EU financial entities or they provide them to you.
  • Through the group, if you have or authorise a subsidiary or a branch in a member state. At that point the entity to look at is the European one, and this test gives a different answer.

And the underlying question does not change country: if someone got into your network today, how long would it take you to see it? Write to [email protected] and we will look at it.

The threshold your authority looks at first

Article 2(2) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 requires authorities to demand a TLPT from a closed list of entities, unless their own assessment of impact, financial stability and ICT risk profile says it is not justified. It is not automatic and the notification is still needed, but it is the criterion applied before any other, and you can check it against your own figures today.

Credit institutions identified as global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) or as other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) under Article 131 of Directive 2013/36/EU, and those forming part of a G-SII or an O-SII.

Payment institutions with payment transactions totalling more than EUR 150 billion in each of the two calendar years preceding the assessment. Electronic money institutions, with that same transaction threshold or with electronic money outstanding totalling more than EUR 40 billion. For account information service providers, Article 2(2) sets no threshold of their own: they are assessed under the general criteria of paragraph 1.

Central securities depositories and central counterparties are on the list with no threshold: all of them. Trading venues with an electronic trading system are in if they hold the largest national market share by turnover in one of the instrument categories listed in point (f), or more than 5% of Union-wide share, in each of the two preceding calendar years. For trade repositories, paragraph 2 sets no threshold of their own.

Insurance and reinsurance undertakings meeting all three criteria of point (g): gross written premiums above EUR 1.5 billion, technical provisions above EUR 10 billion, and, for those pursuing only life activities or both life and non-life, total assets exceeding 3.5% of the sum of total assets of insurance and reinsurance undertakings established in the member state. Within that subset, the obligation is triggered if any of these three also applies: gross written premiums above EUR 3 billion, technical provisions above EUR 30 billion, or total assets above 10% of that same sum. Point (g) is densely drafted: if your figures are anywhere near those numbers, read it directly.

For your type, Article 2(2) sets no threshold of its own. You are assessed under the general criteria of paragraph 1: size, interconnectedness, the critical nature and substitutability of your services, the complexity of your business model, membership of a systemic group, and on the ICT side your risk profile, your threat landscape, how far your critical functions depend on ICT systems, and the maturity of your detection and response.

Who governs your case, in Spain

Article 46 of DORA splits supervision by entity type, referring to the sectoral rules for each figure. One nuance worth having clear before the table: for TLPT the authority may not be the same one. Article 1, point 7, of the RTS defines the TLPT authority as any of three things: the single public authority a member state designates under Article 26(9) of DORA; the authority to which tasks are delegated under Article 26(10); or any of the authorities in Article 46. And Article 16(6) of the RTS expressly contemplates the two being different and having to share information.

The Banco de España. If the bank is classified as significant within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the supervisor is the European Central Bank (Article 46(a)).

The Banco de España (Article 46(b), referring to Article 22 of Directive (EU) 2015/2366).

The Banco de España, which in Spain supervises issuers of asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens under MiCA (Article 46(d)).

The CNMV (Article 46(c)).

The CNMV (Article 46(i) and (j)).

The CNMV for central securities depositories, central counterparties and trading venues (Article 46(e), (f) and (g)). For trade repositories, point (h) refers to Article 22 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, which designates a national authority, and in Spain that is the CNMV. Bear in mind that registration and day-to-day supervision of trade repositories under EMIR sit with ESMA, so here you can have two counterparts.

The CNMV, the competent authority in Spain for MiCA compliance by crypto-asset service providers (Article 46(d)).

The CNMV (Article 46(p)).

It depends which of the four you are. For credit rating agencies, Article 46(n) refers to Article 21 of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, which is ESMA. For securitisation repositories, point (q) refers to Articles 10 and 14(1) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, which is also ESMA. Administrators of critical benchmarks (point (o)) and data reporting service providers (point (g)) are split between ESMA and the national authority depending on the case. Tell us which one you are and we will pin it down.

The Directorate General for Insurance and Pension Funds, the DGSFP (Article 46(k)).

The DGSFP (Article 46(l)).

The DGSFP (Article 46(m)).

And for TIBER-ES: the owning authority of the framework is the Banco de España, with the participation of the CNMV and the DGSFP when the entities to be tested fall within their respective areas of competence.

Your competent authority is the sectoral supervisor of that member state, not the Spanish one. The Spanish split gives you a reference for how this is usually structured: banking and payments with the central bank, markets and investment with the securities supervisor, insurance and pensions with the insurance supervisor.

The entity to look at is the European one, and its competent authority is that of the member state where it is authorised.

Where each piece comes from: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 2, 3, 16, 26, 27 and 46. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190, the TLPT regulatory technical standards, Articles 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12 and 16. The European Central Bank’s TIBER-EU framework, updated on 11 February 2025. The Banco de España’s TIBER-ES implementation guide, January 2022.

Questions that come up before signing.

The questions security leaders ask us most often before the first call.

A red team engagement is a covert, goal-driven simulation of a real attacker, run against your live environment to test not just your defences but whether your team detects and stops an intrusion. Instead of listing vulnerabilities, it emulates a genuine threat actor to reach a defined objective, such as domain control or sensitive data, and measures your detection and response along the way. The deliverable is the attack story, the objectives reached, your MTTD and MTTC, your MITRE ATT&CK coverage, and a plan to close the gaps.

A penetration test finds and validates as many vulnerabilities as possible in a defined scope, announced and cooperative. A red team is covert and goal-driven: one realistic adversary, one objective, testing whether your people, process and technology detect and contain the attack. A pentest answers ‘what is exploitable’; a red team answers ‘would we see them coming, and could we stop them’. They complement each other, and most mature organisations run both on different cycles.

A penetration test first, in almost every case. A red team measures whether your security team and controls work under a realistic attack, which only makes sense once you have those in place. Without a SOC, or with the obvious vulnerabilities still open, a red team would simply confirm what a cheaper penetration test would tell you. We will say so honestly on the introductory meeting rather than sell you the bigger engagement.

TLPT (Threat-Led Penetration Testing) is a regulated, intelligence-driven red team required for certain financial entities under DORA and for institutions taking part in TIBER-EU. It combines a threat-intelligence-based adversary profile with a covert red team against your live production environment, run with a Control Team inside your own organisation and a Test Manager appointed by the TIBER authority. You need it when your competent authority identifies your organisation as required to run a TLPT under Article 26 of DORA, or when you take part in a TIBER-EU or TIBER-ES exercise. The obligation starts when the authority notifies you, not when you cross a size threshold, and Article 27 does not say who must be tested: it sets the bar the testers have to clear. We build our red team engagements on the TIBER-EU method, closing with the replay exercise the framework has required since 2018 and the purple teaming exercise that the 2025 update turned from optional into mandatory.

TIBER-ES is the Spanish implementation of TIBER-EU. Its owning authority is the Banco de España, which adopted the framework in December 2020, with the CNMV and the DGSFP taking part when the entity to be tested falls within their area of competence. The published TIBER-ES implementation guide is dated January 2022, so it predates DORA, the TLPT technical standards and the February 2025 update of TIBER-EU. It still uses the term White Team, which the ECB replaced with Control Team, and it still describes an attestation signed by the entity’s board and its providers. If your test runs under DORA, the current framework and the technical standards are the reference. We read both before we scope, and we tell you which text governs your test.

The TIBER authority signs it. Not the testing provider, and not the entity being tested, and that is a recent change. Article 26(7) of DORA says authorities provide the financial entity with an attestation confirming that the test was performed in accordance with the requirements, and the TLPT technical standards put that duty on the TLPT authority. The 2025 TIBER-EU framework is just as plain: the attestation should be signed by the TIBER authority, and issuing it concludes the test. Older texts, including the January 2022 TIBER-ES guide, still describe an attestation signed by the entity’s board and its providers. So we do not attest our own work. We produce the red team test report and the evidence the authority examines, and DORA is explicit that an attestation does not move responsibility for the impact of the test away from the financial entity.

No, that is what the safety design is for. Every engagement runs with a Control Team (a small, informed group inside your organisation), documented Rules of Engagement, and a Pre-Out checkpoint where we pause and confirm before touching anything truly critical. We never take destructive action against production, and we can stop the exercise at any moment. The goal is to measure your response, not to cause the incident.

A red team typically runs three to six weeks, because realism means patience: intelligence gathering, a careful way in, quiet movement and time for your team to detect us. TLPT engagements under DORA or TIBER-EU run considerably longer: the active red team phase alone carries a regulatory minimum of 12 weeks, with the threat-intelligence and closing phases on either side of it. We agree the window and the milestones in the proposal, delivered within 48 hours of the first call.

Price follows the objective, the model (Initial Access or Assumed Breach), the duration and whether physical or social-engineering scope is included. We quote a fixed price with no hidden fees. A focused Assumed Breach engagement starts well above a standard pentest given the time involved, and a full-scope Initial Access engagement scales from there. The replay exercise and a retest of the fixes are always included.

A senior specialist leads it end to end, the person you meet on the first call. Our team holds OSCP, OSCE³, OSEP, CRTO and CRTP credentials, the certifications built around red-team tradecraft; most have worked inside enterprise security teams, and we are NASA Bug Bounty verified contributors. The same lead scopes, executes, runs the Attack Replay and retests. You speak to that lead throughout the exercise.

Ready to test your resilience against a real adversary?

Start with a no-obligation introductory meeting. We will agree the objective, the model and the rules, and define the right red team engagement before it begins.

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